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1 Introduction
Our story begins in February of 1829 with the death of the Right Honourable and Reverend Francis
Henry Edgerton, eighth Earl of Bridgewater. This unconventional man, with eccentricities that
included dressing his dogs in custom-made clothing, had a deep interest in natural theology. This
passion ran so deep that the Earl of Bridgewater’s will made provision for eight thousand pounds
to be invested and placed at the disposal of the President of the Royal Society of London. The
person or persons selected by the president should be appointed to write, print, and publish one
thousand copies of a work:
On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in the Creation; illustrating
such work by all reasonable arguments, as for instance the variety and formation of
God’s creatures in the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms, the effect of digestion,
and thereby of conversion; the construction of the hand of man; and an infinite variety
of other arguments. [1]
Eight men were chosen by the President of the Royal Society to carry out the wishes of the late Earl
of Bridgewater. The Reverend William Whewell, fellow of Trinity College Cambridge, authored
the first published Bridgewater treatise entitled Astronomy and General Physics Considered with
Reference to Natural Theology. In it he made the following comment:
We may thus, with the greatest propriety, deny to the mechanical philosophers and
mathematicians of recent times any authority with regard to their views of the admin-
istration of the universe; we have no reason whatever to expect from their speculations
any help, when we ascend to the first cause and supreme rule of the universe. But we
might perhaps go farther, and assert that they are in some respects less likely than
men employed in other pursuits, to make any clear advance toward such a subject of
speculation. [7]
Upon reading this, Charles Babbage decided to respond. At the time, the 45 year old was well
known throughout Great Britain as a mathematician and inventor. He was Lucasian Professor of
Mathematics at Cambridge, a post that Newton once held. Babbage’s analytical difference engine,
a precursor to our computer, had been funded by an act of Parliament to aid in navigational
calculations.
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Provoked by Whewell, Babbage replied to him, and the Bridgewater Treatises in general, by pub-
lishing a what he referred to as “a fragment” of his own. He titled it The Ninth Bridgewater
Treatise. Although he was quick to note in the preface that this work was not part of the original
set of treatises, he justified his appropriation of the title because he was furthering the intentions
of the late Earl of Bridgewater. To make clear his intentions, on its title page he included the
quotation from Whewell, and stated in the preface that he wrote his treatise due to the prejudice
he encountered in Whewell’s Bridgewater Treatise.
Babbage’s motivation was not merely due to Whewell’s provocation. Later in the preface Babbage
stated, “One of the chief defects of the Treatises above referred to appear to me to arise from
their not pursuing the argument to a sufficient extent.” He went on to assert that some of his
abstract mathematical inquiries, “most removed from any practical application” have led to new
perspectives and analogies concerning natural theology. This is illustrated most fully in Chapters
VIII through X of The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise.
2 Miracles in The Ninth Bridgewater
In chapter VIII of The Ninth Bridgewater, Babbage examined the nature of miracles. The theolog-
ical question of how God interacts with his creation had received renewed interest in pre-Victorian
England. Much of this was due to a variety of scientific discoveries, particularly in geology. Miracles
in particular drew the attention of several writers of natural theology. [3] The Ninth Bridgewater
can be examined as one of several works during this time concerning the miraculous. According to
Babbage
. . . it is more consistent with the attributes of the Deity to look upon miracles not as
deviations from the laws assigned by the Almighty for the government of matter and of
mind; but as the exact fulfillment of much more extensive laws than those we suppose
to exist. [1]
Babbage remarked that such a view of the miraculous assigns greater power and knowledge to God
than a God who is constantly intervening or even interfering in creation. He then proceeded to
illustrate his views with two extended mathematical examples.
The first of these concerns a mechanical calculator known as a difference engine. Babbage described
God as a master programmer of the universe. He is one who programmed the apparent exceptions
- the miracles - to follow a uniform natural law. Babbage envisioned an observer of a difference
engine who witnesses a sequence of numbers as outputs of the machine. Without fail, every one
of these numbers is a perfect square. After millions of observations, one of the numbers is not
a perfect square. The pattern of square numbers then returns exactly where it had left off, and
continues on for every other observation.
This scenario is analogous to the way that a natural law would be inferred from numerous obser-
vations. In this case, the observer might say, “This machine always produces square numbers.”
The one supposed exception to the sequence of square numbers is likened by Babbage as a miracle.
This anomaly could have resulted from several causes, but only two were considered. The first
explanation was that a secret lever, hidden from view, was activated by the machine’s creator to
produce the intended effect. Another explanation of the aberration is that the supposed exception
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Figure 1: Figure from page 101 of The Ninth Bridgewater
of the rule had been programmed into the machine.
Which of these two cases shows the greater power of workmanship for one who built the difference
engine? For Babbage, the second case demonstrates that a greater mind and power was at work.
In a similar way, miracles, which are supposed exceptions to natural law, are really part of a more
complex pattern working.
Babbage’s second illustration shared the same perspective of the miraculous as his difference engine
thought experiment. However, the second illustration utilized an entirely different area of mathe-
matics. At first glance, the various curves on page 101 of The Ninth Bridgewater, which are shown
in Figure 1, appear different from one another. The first two are connected, the third contains two
portions that are separate from a larger closed curve, and the fourth contains two singular points.
For the fourth curve in particular, sight alone would lead to the conclusion that points P and Q are
exceptions to the infinitely many observations that comprise the connected portion. However, as
Babbage explained in a note, these singular points as well as points on the curve can be described by
the same equation. Moreover, all four the figures on page 101 can be generated from the following
equation, where a, b, c, d, and e are all constants that can be varied:
(y2 − 2)2 = −ax4 + bx3 + cx2 + dx+ e. (1)
Thus in Figure 1, the points P and Q satisfy the same equation as every point on the curve. The
apparent deviations from the closed curve are really manifestations of a higher law, imperceptible
to sight, but detectable by mathematics.
Babbage did not give the specific constants used to produce each of the curves in Figure 1. Exper-
imentation, using a graphing utility such as Desmos, achieves a reasonably close approximation.
An interesting exercise in curve sketching reveals how the roots of the quartic on the right side of
Equation (1) affect the behavior of the curve.
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We begin with a quartic polynomial possessing a negative leading coefficient. The other coefficients
are given values so that there are only two real roots of the quartic, r1 and r2, and the three critical
points of the graph of the polynomial are in the interval (r1, r2). The left side of Figure 2 shows
one example of this. We then vary only the constant term and observe that the shapes similar to
those displayed in Figure 1 begin to emerge as the roots of the quartic change. On the right side of
Figure 2 there are four real roots, one of which is repeated, a critical point, and between the other
two roots. On the left side of Figure 3 there are four distinct real roots. Finally, on the right side
of Figure 3 there are four real roots, one of which is repeated, and is not between the other two
roots. For these particular values of the coefficient the two singular points appear.
Figure 2: Graphs of y = −3x4 + 8.5x2 + 4x + e in blue and (y2 − 2)2 = −3x4 + 8.5x2 + 4x + e in
black for e = 1 and 0.48
Figure 3: Graphs of y = −3x4 + 8.5x2 + 4x + e in blue and (y2 − 2)2 = −3x4 + 8.5x2 + 4x + e in
black for e = 0 and −1.52
Babbage had Whewell’s quotation in mind as he concluded chapter IX of The Ninth Bridgewater
Treatise. According to Babbage, this example opened “views of the grandeur of creation perhaps
more extensive than any which the sciences of observation or of physics have yet supplied.” [1] Not
everyone agreed. For instance, the Roman Catholic priest D.W. Cahill commented on the flaws of
Babbage’s analogy. The miraculous had been reduced to a more extended natural machinery. As
Cahill wrote to the bishops of England, “Was there ever published such a monstrous conceit as to
reduce miracles to a formula in algebra - to a curve of four dimensions!” [2]
Cahill’s comment does spark the interesting question of why Babbage chose this particular curve
for his example. Other curves of lower degree will exhibit similar behavior. For instance, the graph
of y2 = −x3 +x+ c changes its number of components and even has a singular point depending on
the value of c.
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3 Babbage and Hume
Babbage’s examination of the miraculous needed to confront a deeper issue that had arisen nearly
a century earlier. In 1748 the Scottish philosopher David Hume published An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding. In section X, known as “Of Miracles,” Hume contended that miracles,
which he considered violation of the laws of nature, were so unlikely as to not exist. There are
several elements to “Of Miracles,” and the one that drew Babbage attention relates to testimony
of miraculous events.
In Hume’s words
The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), that no
testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that
its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish. [4]
The use of the word “miraculous” concerning testimony has obscured some of Hume’s meaning,
but reference to another key passage clarifies this usage. Elsewhere in section X Hume remarked
When any one tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider
with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or
be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh
the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I
pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. [4]
To establish that a miracle has occurred, following Hume, “the falsehood of testimony of the miracle
must be more miraculous than the miracle.” By meeting Hume on his own terms, Babbage recast
Hume’s criterion to read, “The falsehood of testimony of the miracle must be more improbable than
the miracle.”
This restatement was not original to Babbage. A similar argument can be traced as far back as
George Campbell’s A Dissertation on Miracles in 1762. What was novel in Babbage’s approach
was to use mathematical formalism to further restate Hume’s criterion. A miracle has occurred if
P ( Falsehood of Testimony of Miracle ) < P ( Miracle ). (2)
Babbage realized that Hume had simply stated an equivalent version of this criterion, and then
asserted that it could never be met. Hume had made no effort to weigh the probabilities in the
above inequality. Chapter X and Appendix E of The Ninth Bridgewater concern the calculation of
these probabilities. We will follow and expand on Babbage’s line of argument.
We begin with the calculation of the probability of a miracle. In order to assign a numerical value
to this probability, Babbage uses Laplace’s rule of succession. Laplace derived this result in order
to confront the so-called sunrise problem [5]. Given that the sun has risen a specified number of
times, and there is no prior knowledge on what it will do tomorrow, what is the probability that
the sun rises again? More generally, suppose that there are N observations, which can either be
classified as a success or a failure, and that s successes were observed. The probability that the
N + 1 observation is a success is given by the following formula
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P (N + 1 observation is a success |s successes ) = s+ 1
N + 2 . (3)
In order to use Equation 3 regarding something as miraculous as a dead person being restored to
life, Babbage made several rough estimates and provided us with the details. He first supposed that
the world is 6000 years old, and that there have consistently been 30 years per generation. Thus
there have been 200 generations of people since the beginning of the world. He further estimates
that at every point in history the earth’s human population has numbered 1 billion, which was
the estimated world population in the mid-nineteenth century. This gave Babbage the estimate
that 200 billion people have died, which is used as the value for N in Equation 3. For the sake
of argument, Babbage supposed that following the death of every one of these 200 billion, none of
them were restored to life. With no successes, the value of s = 0. By Laplace’s rule of succession,
the probability that the next person who dies will be restored to life is
s+ 1
N + 2 =
0 + 1
200,000,000,000 + 2 =
1
200,000,000,002 ≈ 5 · 10
−12.
This is an astonishingly small probability, but it is not zero.
We now consider the probability of the falsehood of testimony concerning a miracle. Babbage sup-
posed mutually independent witnesses who are reliable 99% of the time. Given two such witnesses,
due to the crucial assumption of independence, the probability that they both agree on a falsehood
is (1/100) ·(1/100) = 1/10, 000. Each additional independent witness will further reduce the overall
probability of mistaken or false testimony. With n such witnesses
P ( Falsehood of Testimony ) = (1/100)n. (4)
To return to Hume’s criterion, in order to establish by testimony that something as seemingly
impossible as a dead person being restored to life had occurred, we would need to combine Equation
4 with our probability of a miracle 2 · 10−11 in the inequality 2. A miracle has occurred when
(1/100)n < 5 · 10−12.
The question then becomes how large must n be in order to satisfy the inequality.
With only n = 6 witnesses that match Babbage’s description, the probability that they all give
false testimony (either intentionally or unintentionally) concerning the restoration of a dead person
to life is (1/100)6 = 10−12. This probability is less than the probability of a dead person being
restored to life that was calculated above to be approximately 5 · 10−12. By Hume’s own criterion,
such a miracle could be established by testimony.
In appendix E of The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise by use of several mathematical proofs, each
making subtle distinctions in the nature of the testimony of a purported miracle, Babbage consid-
ered other situations. For example, what if the witnesses are less reliable than 99% of the time?
Variations on the original question were summarized by Babbage (with emphasis in original):
. . . if independent witnesses can be found, who speak truth more frequently than false-
hood, it is ALWAYS possible to assign a number of independent witnesses, the im-
probability of the falsehood of whose concurring testimony shall be greater than the
improbability of the miracle itself. [1]
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4 Conclusion
Although many of us, including myself, would disagree with Babbage’s definition of a miracle, The
Ninth Bridgewater Treatise provides a fascinating historical example of the integration of faith and
mathematics. Babbage’s refutation of Hume as well as his dispute with Whewell demonstrated a
firm conviction and willingness to engage with his opponent on his opponent’s terms, modelling a
type of civility in disagreement.
There are several places in the undergraduate mathematics curriculum where the ideas from The
Ninth Bridgewater could be discussed. The specific calculations performed by Babbage could be
demonstrated as in-class examples of probability to illustrate concepts such as independence. An
upper-division seminar course could evaluate Babbage’s argument and discuss the role of mathe-
matics in Christian apologetics.
A series of questions below would help start a seminar discussion concerning some of the issues
underlying Babbage’s examination of the miraculous.
• What was some more of the historical context underlying the discussion of miracles? See, for
instance, [3] and [6].
• What are some flaws in how Babbage defined a miracle?
• What is your definition of a miracle? How does your definition compare or contrast with
Babbage’s interpretation? How does your definition compare or contrast with Hume’s inter-
pretation?
• Was Babbage’s interpretation of a miracle in a naturalistic setting consistent with a Biblical
understanding of the miraculous?
• How effective was Babbage’s use of mathematical analogies to illustrate his conception of
a miracle? What are the advantages and limitations to using mathematical analogies to
illustrate theological truths?
• How effective do you think Babbage’s argument concerning the miraculous would be to an
unbeliever?
• What are some other arguments, besides Babbage’s, that refute Hume’s “Of Miracles”?
• What is an appropriate response today to those who would challenge the existence of miracles
and our faith in them?
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